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Not  less  than  eight  nor  more  than  twelve.  That 
was  the  number  of regional  reserve  banks  specified 
in the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  19 13. To  implement 
its  provisions,  the  Act  called  for  the  establishment 
of  a  Reserve  Bank  Organization  Committee  made 
up  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the  Secretary 
of  Agriculture,  and  the  Comptroller  of  the  Cur- 
rency.  The  first  two  of  these  offices  were  held, 
respectively,  by  William  Gibbs  McAdoo  and  David 
F.  Houston.  The  third  was vacant  at the  time  of the 
passage  of the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  but  shortly  after- 
ward  President  Wilson  appointed  John  Skelton 
Williams,  a well-known  banker  and  businessman  of 
Richmond,  Virginia,  to  fill  the  vacancy.  Senate 
action  on  that  appointment,  however,  was  delayed 
until  mid-January.  In  early  January,  McAdoo  ap- 
pointed  H.  Parker  Willis  to  head  a special  subcom- 
mittee  of  technical  experts,  styled  the  Preliminary 
Committee  on  Organization  to  assist  with  the  work. 
Not  content  to  await  the  report  of  this  group, 
McAdoo  and  Houston,  constituting  a quorum  of the 
Organization  Committee,  set  out  to  hold  their  own 
hearings.  Hearings  were  held  first  in  New  York, 
beginning  on  January  4,  then  in  Boston,  with  the 
Committee  returning  to Washington  for  hearings  on 
January  15.  Following  these,  McAdoo  and  Houston 
traveled  some  10,000  miles  around  the  country  and 
held  hearings  in  18  cities.  In  the  course  of  these 
hearings  37  cities  asked  to  be  made  headquarters  of 
a  reserve  bank,  supporting  their  petitions  with 
generous  reams  of  economic  data  mixed  with  large 
dollops  of  civic  pride  and  booster  spirit.  Of  the 
hearings,  Houston  wrote: 
It  soon  appeared  that  city,  state,  and  sectional  pride  was 
involved;  and  that  we  were  in  for  a great  deal  of  roasting 
no  matter  what  we  decided.  It  also  became  obvious  that 
if we  created  fewer  banks  than  the  maximum  fixed  by  law, 
the  Reserve  Board  would  have  no  peace  till  that  number 
was  reached.  .  .  . 
There  was  a vast  amount  of state  and  city  pride  revealed 
to  us  in  the  hearings;  and  to  hear  some  of  the  speeches 
one  would  have  thought  that  not  to  select  the  city  of  the 
advocate  would  mean  its ruin  and  that  of their  (sic] territory. 
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The  petition  of the  city  of Richmond,  Virginia,  was 
heard  at the  Washington  meeting  on January  1.5. Also 
heard  at these  Washington  meetings  were  delegations 
from  Philadelphia,  Pittsburgh,  Baltimore,  Wash- 
ington,  West  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  and  South 
Carolina. 
The  Campaign  for a Richmond  Location 
The  Richmond  banking  community  and  the  city’s 
two  major  newspapers  followed  closely  the  progress 
of  the  Glass-Owen  bill  (the  currency  bill  ai  it  was 
generally  referred  to  at  the  time)  through  the 
legislative  mill.  The  major  role  played  by  Virginians 
in shaping  the  bill and  directing  it through  Congress 
gave  the  legislation  special  interest  locally.  Yet  this 
interest  did  not  translate  into  sentiment  for  locating 
a  reserve  bank  in  Richmond  until  after  the  bill 
became  law. 
Contemporaneous  newspaper  accounts  credit  the 
incumbent  governor,  William  Hodges  Mann,  with 
the  initial  suggestion  that  an  effort  be  made  to 
locate  a  reserve  bank  in  Richmond.  According  to 
these  accounts,  Governor  Mann,  in  a  letter  dated 
December  2,  1913,  to  Oliver  J.  Sands,  a prominent 
Richmond  banker,  noted  impending  passage  of the 
currency  bill  and  suggested  that  Richmond  might 
well  be  an  appropriate  site  for  one  of  the  several 
reserve  banks  envisaged.  Sands  is reported  to  have 
approached  the  local  clearinghouse  association  with 
the  idea  and  to  have  found  the  members  skeptical. 
According  to  one  account,  four  of  the  six  clearing- 
house  banks  thought  it  would  be  “useless  to  work 
for  a [reserve]  bank  for  Richmond,”  while  the  chair- 
man  of  the  association  “doubted  that  the  idea  was 
worth  a formal  meeting.” 
Sentiment  in  favor  of  an  active  effort  to  have 
Richmond  designated  as  a  reserve  bank  site  did 
not  develop  until  after  enactment  of  the  bill  on 
December  23.  Articles  in  the  local  press  on 
December  24,  25,  and  26 did not  include  Richmond 
in  listings  of  cities  likely  to  be  chosen  as  locations 
for  reserve  banks. 
On  December  27,  however,  the  city’s  evening 
paper,  the  N~XXU  Leader,  carried  a  front-page  story 
under  a three-column  headline:  “Reserve  Bank  To 
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a  meeting  of  all  local  banks  eligible  for  member- 
ship  in  the  new  system  for  Monday  afternoon, 
December  29,  at  the  Business  Men’s  Club,  to  be 
followed  by  a meeting  of the  members  of that  club. 
The  story  noted  that  Atlanta  was already  “in the  field 
as a candidate  for one  of the  regional  banks”  and that 
“it is the  belief of many  bankers  that  the  reserve  bank 
to  be  located  in  the  South  will  be  placed  either  in 
that  city or in Richmond.  . . .” It added  that  the  Rich- 
mond  campaign  “must  accordingly  be  prosecuted 
with  vigor.” 
Obviously  the  local banking  community,  perhaps 
under  Sands’ initiative,  had,  quite  suddenly,  upgraded 
Richmond’s  chances.  The  reasons  for  this  are  not 
clear.  On  December  23,  the  day  that  President 
Wilson  signed  the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  it became 
known  that  John  Skelton  Williams,  a Richmonder, 
would  be  appointed  Comptroller  of the  Currency. 
That  appointment,  if confirmed  by the  U.S.  Senate, 
would  place  the  choice  of regional  reserve  cities  in 
the  hands  of a native  son  and two other  Southerners, 
as  McAdoo  was  a native  of  Georgia  and  Houston, 
of  North  Carolina.  Whether  the  notion  that  an 
Organization  Committee  so constituted  would  tend 
to look with  special  favor on Richmond  played  a role 
in the  reevaluation  is moot.  In any case  shortly  after 
passage  of  the  Act  it  became  clear  that  a  sizable 
number  of cities,  including  some  in the  Old  South, 
would  be  vying  for  a regional  reserve  bank.  In  that 
context,  the  idea  that  Richmond,  as  a  long-time 
leader  of  the  Old  South,  might  prove  a  likely  site 
for  a  regional  bank  appears  altogether  reasonable 
independently  of  the  makeup  of  the  Organization 
Committee.  The  key  role  played  by  Virginians  in 
devising,  legislating,  and  now  implementing  the  new 
system  no doubt  provided  encouragement.  But that 
it was  the  critical  factor  in the  decision  of the  city’s 
leaders  to seek  a reserve  bank  is questionable.  That 
the  Richmond  leaders  were  not  prepared  to  count 
on political  favoritism  is indicated  by their  retention 
at  some  early  stage  of  two  of  the  nation’s  highly 
regarded  professional  banking  consultants  to evaluate 
the  case  for  locating  a reserve  bank  in  Richmond. 
These  consultants-Charles  A. Conant  of New  York 
and  0.  P.  Austin  of  Washington,  D.C.-came  to 
Richmond  and  after  several  days  study  pronounced 
Richmond  an  eminently  appropriate  site. 
Whatever  the  case,  the  December  29 meetings  at 
the  Business  Men’s  Club  were  decisive,  dispelling 
the  doubts  expressed  earlier  by  the  clearinghouse 
banks.  The  bankers’  meeting,  under  the  chairman- 
ship  of Sands,  quickly  and  unanimously  passed  the 
following  resolution: 
Resolved:  That  the  banks  of Richmond  cooperate  with  the 
commercial  bodies  of this  city  to  secure  the  nomination  of 
Richmond  as  the  location  of  one  of  the  federal  reserve 
banks,  believing  that  its  banking  capital  and  surplus,  its 
geographical  location  and  its  railroad  facilities  with  all 
points  in  the  territory  named,  as  well  as  its  proximity  to 
the  great  trade  center,  renders  it the  most  convenient  for 
those  cities  for  the  transaction  of  their  business. 
As  the  natural  point  of trade  for the  South  Atlantic  states 
and  portions  of Tennessee  and  West  Virginia  it is entitled 
to  such  consideration.  It  is  the  most  important  city  in 
finance,  trade  and  population  in  the  territory  named.  It  is 
in the  trend  of trade  and  finance  to the  North  and  East  and 
numbers  now  among  its depositors  a large  number  of banks 
in  the  sections  named. 
The  Business  Men’s  Club,  meeting  the  same  day, 
endorsed  the  resolution  and  joined  the  bankers  in 
calling  on  all local  civic  groups  to  appoint  commit- 
tees  to  constitute  a grand  Committee  on  Locating 
a  Federal  Reserve  Bank  in  Richmond. 
From  that  point  until  the  selection  of reserve  bank 
sites  on  April  2,  the  local  press  joined  the  city’s 
several  civic  groups  in  a  campaign  remarkable  for 
its  unbridled  American  booster  spirit  and  for  its 
effectiveness  in putting  together  a convincing  case 
in  a  brief  span  of  time.  Civic  groups  responded 
promptly  and  on  December  31  the  Committee  for 
Locating  a Federal  Reserve  Bank  in Richmond  was 
formally  established.  An  executive  committee  was 
appointed  to  plan  and  direct  the  campaign.  Sands 
was named  chairman  of this committee.  A slogan was 
adopted:  “A Southern  Bank  for A Southern  People.” 
The  Committee  went  to work  immediately,  with 
enthusiasm.  Headquarters  were  set up in the Business 
Men’s  Club  and  a clerical  staff  quickly  assembled. 
Literature  promoting  Richmond’s  advantages  over 
other  South  Atlantic  cities  was  hastily  prepared  for 
dissemination  over  a broad  area deemed  to comprise 
an  appropriate  Richmond  reserve  district.  Local 
teams  worked  feverishly  gathering  data  from  the 
city’s  banks,  railroads,  commercial  establishments, 
and  other  organizations  for  preparation  of briefs  to 
be  presented  to the  Organization  Committee.  Field 
committees  were  set  up  to  visit  key  cities  in  the 
Southeast  to  solicit  support  for  the  Richmond  site. 
Time  was  short  since  it was  known  early  in January 
that  the  Organization  Committee  would  hear  Rich- 
mond’s  claim  on  or  about  January  15. 
In  delineating  an  appropriate  Richmond  reserve 
district,  the  Richmond  leaders  obviously  wanted  to 
justify  their  slogan:  “A Southern  Bank for A Southern 
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fusion.  Should  there  be just  one  Southern  bank  for 
Southern  people  or  could  there  be  two?  At  that 
early  stage  it was  not  clear  just  how  many  regional 
banks  would  be  established  and judgments  regarding 
the  geographical  limits  of  a  proposed  Richmond 
district  were  necessarily  tentative.  There  was  some 
tendency  to  think  in terms  of the  old  Confederacy 
and  field  committees  were  set  up  to  visit  cities  as 
distant  as  Birmingham,  Alabama  and  Houston, 
Texas.  But  it  was  decided  to  place  before  the 
Organization  Committee  a  proposed  district  that 
embraced  Virginia,  the  Carolinas,.  Florida,  the 
southern  half  of  West  Virginia,  and  large  parts  of 
eastern  Kentucky,  eastern  Tennessee,  and  eastern 
Georgia. 
The  boundaries  of the  proposed  district  might  well 
have  been  influenced  by  the  Richmond  leaders’ 
perception  of  the  competition  they  confronted. 
Washington,  Baltimore,  and  Atlanta  were  viewed  as 
principal  competitors,  although  the  first  mentioned 
appears  to  have  been  taken  progressively  less 
seriously  with  the  passage  of time.  Without  power- 
ful  senators  and  congressmen  to  press  its  case, 
with  little  standing  as  a  commercial  or  financial 
center,  and  with  general  suspicions  that  an  institu- 
tion  located  in the  nation’s  capital  would  be  subject 
to political  influence,  Washington  was  at a disadvan- 
tage.  The  inclusion  of a sizable  portion  of the  state 
of  Georgia  might  well  have  been  designed  to 
denigrate  Atlanta’s  claim  and  to  focus  attention  on 
New  Orleans  as the  likely  site,  next  to  Richmond, 
of an appropriate  Southern  reserve  bank.  The  initial 
exclusion  of Maryland  was  rationalized  on  grounds 
that  Maryland  was  neither  a truly  Southern  state  nor 
properly  a part  of the  same  geographic  region  as the 
area  south  of the  Potomac.  But there  was  also a sug- 
gestion  here  that  Baltimore  might  more  appropriately 
be  lumped  with  Philadelphia  rather  than  with  the 
South  Atlantic  states. 
Despite  the  great  geographic  extent  of  the  pro- 
posed  district,  the  Richmond  campaign  concentrated 
its promotional  efforts  heavily  in the  two  Carolinas. 
A  team  under  the  leadership  of  W.  T.  Dabney, 
business  manager  of  the  Richmond  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  toured  the  two  states  between  January  6 
and January  17 touting  the  advantages  of Richmond 
and  the  benefits  to  the  Carolinas  that  would  result 
from  the  location  of a reserve  bank  in that  city.  Both 
local newspapers  followed the tour  closely day by day, 
reporting  with  obvious  satisfaction  the  support  ex- 
pressed  in virtually  all the  cities  visited.  Meanwhile, 
the  staff  at headquarters  at the  Richmond  Business 
Men’s  Club  worked  long  hours  busily  preparing 
promotional  literature  for circulation  among  business 
and  banking  groups  in  the  key  cities  of  the  pro- 
posed  district  and  receiving  a mounting  number  of 
endorsements  for Richmond,  mainly  from  banks  in 
the  Carolinas. 
A problem  developed  for  the  Richmond  touring 
group  when,  while the  tour was in progress,  Charlotte 
and  Columbia  decided  to  seek  regional  banks. 
The  campaigns  of  these  two  cities  were  mounted 
hastily,  however,  and  lacked  the  comprehensive 
organization  and  drive  of the  Richmond  campaign. 
They  were  seriously  hampered,  moreover,  by the fact 
that  many  of the  leading  bankers  of their  states  had 
already  openly  pledged  support  for Richmond.  This 
was  especially  the  case  with  respect  to  Charlotte. 
Bankers  in Raleigh,  Winston-Salem,  Rocky  Mount, 
Tarboro,  Concord  and  in  numerous  smaller  towns 
had  enthusiastically  endorsed  the  Richmond  can- 
didacy  and  the  state’s  bankers’  association  was 
pledged  to  send  a  delegation  to  support  the  Rich- 
mond  cause  at  the  January  1.5 hearings  in  Wash- 
ington.  In  South  Carolina,  Spartanburg,  Greenville 
and  Charleston  had  already  strongly  endorsed  Rich- 
mond  and  by  mid-January  some  South  Carolina 
bankers  were  mounting  an  effort  to  coax  Columbia 
bankers  into  a like endorsement.  The  Charlotte  and 
Columbia  campaigns  can  best  be  explained,  perhaps, 
as  efforts  to  position  these  cities  as  sites  for 
branches  of the  regional  head  offices  at  some  later 
date.  In  any  case,  the  Richmonders  handled  this 
problem  adroitly,  refusing  to be  drawn  into  an open 
confrontation  with  major  cities  of  the  Carolinas. 
Rather  their  tactic  was to seek  endorsement  of Rich- 
mond  as  the  second  choice  of  both  Charlotte  and 
Columbia. 
By mid-January  the  basic  strategy  underlying  the 
Richmond  effort  had  crystallized  firmly.  It was,  first, 
to forge a solid alliance  of Virginia with  the  Carolinas, 
the  three  states  to  constitute  the  core  of a reserve 
district  to  be  expanded  as  necessary  to  meet  the 
statutory  capital  requirements  for a reserve  bank.  An 
important  element  in this  alliance  was general  agree- 
ment  that  the  Carolinas  should  express  unalterable 
opposition  to being  linked  to  any  city  to their  south 
or  their  west.  The  oft-repeated  argument  was  that 
the  normal  commercial  and  financial  flows  from  the 
South  Atlantic  states  ran from  the  south  to the  north 
and  northeast  and  could  be  accommodated  ade- 
quately  only  by  a city  to  their  north  and  preferably 
by one fairly close  to the  great  commercial  and finan- 
cial  centers-of  the  East.  Against  that  background, 
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tages  of  Richmond  as  .a  transportation  and  com- 
munication  center  relatively  easily accessible  to even 
remote  parts  of the  Southeast  and within  quick  reach 
of  all the  large  Eastern  centers. 
I 
The  strategy  also contemplated  dealing  with  rivals. 
There  was  general  understanding  of the  probability 
that  location  of a bank  at Philadelphia  would  seriously 
undercut  the  chances  of Baltimore  and Washington. 
Hence  Richmonders  at a fairly early  stage  tended  to 
favor Philadelphia.  Southward,  a systematic  effort was 
launched  to put  banks  in the  Carolinas  on  record  as 
opposing  any connection  with  Atlanta.  Charlotteans, 
in  particular,  actively  ,opposed  Atlanta,  tending  to 
favor  New  Orleans  over  that  city,  believing  perhaps 
that  a  regional  bank  in  Atlanta  would  prejudice 
Charlotte’s  chances  for  even  a branch  bank. 
The  Washington  Hearings 
The  Richmond  campaign  was  managed  with 
notable  skill,  commanding  the  plaudits  even  of  its 
rivals.  Floods  of  promotional  literature  were  dis- 
seminated  over  the  South  Atlantic  region,  reaching 
small  towns  as well as the  principal  cities.  The  tours 
of  the  traveling  teams-referred  to  variously  as 
“missionaries”  or  “boosters’‘-proved  eminently 
successful  in  creating  a  crucial  solidarity  between 
Virginia  and  the  Carolinas.  The  state  of Virginia  was 
mobilized  fully and  enthusiastically  behind  the  city’s 
effort,  with  newspapers  in every  section  offering day- 
by-day  accounts  of the  progress  of the  campaign.  In 
the  best  spirit  of  American  boosterism,  the  city’s 
mayor,  the  state’s  governor  and  governor-elect,  and 
the  general  assembly  .were  all pressed  into  the  ser- 
vice  of the  campaign.  Similarly,  the  state’s  congres- 
sional delegation  was committed  to using its influence 
and  best  efforts  on  behalf  of  Richmond. 
Meanwhile  the  local  committee  was  preparing  to 
make  its  case  before  the  Organization  Committee 
on January  15. Much  of the  burden  of preparing  the 
brief to be presented  fell on George  J. Seay  who  had 
also  been  a leading  performer  in  the  presentations 
made  by the  traveling  groups  in the  Carolinas.  Seay 
was  selected  to  make  the  oral  presentation  before 
the  Organization  Committee.  There  were  only  18 
days between  the  time  Seay was-retained  by the local 
committee  and  the  date  of the  hearings  and  many 
of these  days were  spent  promoting  Richmond’s  case 
in  the  Carolinas.  Despite  the  brief  period  of  time 
available ‘to him  Seay produced  a well-reasoned  brief, 
offering  much  statistical  data.  in  support  of. Rich- 
mond’s  candidacy.  The  argument  was predicated  on 
the  establishment  of  a  reserve  district,  made  up 
mainly  of  South  Atlantic  states  with  parts  of West 
Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee.  The..  brief 
emphasized: 
(1)  The’  city’s  geographical  location,,  providing  a 
natural  point  of linkage  between  the’ South’ Atlantic 
and  the  great  centers’  of  the  Northeast  in  the 
predominantly  south-to-north  flow of commerce  and 
finance.  ‘. 
(2)  .The. city’s  superior  transportation  and  com- 
munications  facilities,  with  north-south  -and  east- 
west  rail  lines,.  supplemented  by  river  and  coastal 
waterways  allowing  .quick  and  economical  contact 
with  virtually  every  point  in  the  proposed  district, 
thus  providing  a *natural point  for clearing  checks  and 
distributing  currency. 
(3)  Virginia’s preeminence  among  Southern  states 
in banking  and  Richmond’s  extensive  banking  con- 
nections,  both  as a holder  of bankers’  balances  and 
a lender,  with  all parts  of the  proposed  district,  show- 
ing Richmond  to be  a natural  reserve  center  despite 
its  exclusion  from  the  list  of  official  reserve  cities. 
(4)  Richmond’s  importance  as  a  commercial  as 
well  as financial  center,  with  long-standing  friendly 
business  connections  with  all parts  of the  proposed 
district. 
The  brief  offered  banking,  financial,  and  business 
statistics  to  compare  Virginia,  favorably,  with  other 
Southern  states  and  to show  Richmond  to be  better 
situated  than  any  other  city  in the  proposed  district 
to become  the  site  of a reserve  bank.  Finally,  much 
was  made  of  the  heavy  support  for lthe  Richmond 
candidacy  throughout  the  proposed  district  but 
especially  in  the  Carolinas. 
The  local  committee  worked  feverishly  at  orga- 
nizing  an impressive  appearance  before  the  Organi- 
zation  Committee.  Delegations  from  the  Carolinas, 
including  high  officers  from  each  of the  two  states’ 
banking  associations,  were  enlisted  to accompany  the 
Richmond  delegation  to Washington  and  to express 
their  support  before  the  Organization  Committee. 
Governor  Mann,  Governor-elect  Stuart  and represen- 
tatives  from  the  General  Assembly  accompanied  the 
Richmond  delegation,  which  far -outnumbered  that 
of  any  other  city  making  presentations  at  the 
Washington  hearings. 
The  hearings  were  held  in  the  office  of  John 
Skelton  Williams,  then  an Assistant  Secretary  of the 
Treasury,  and  presided  over  by  Secretary  McAdoo. 
The  chief.protagonist  was  Seay.  In his presentation 
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details  and  intentions  of the  Federal  Reserve  Act  as 
well  as  of the  economic  characteristics  of  the  pro- 
posed  district.  Despite  a grandiloquent  style that  was 
more  appreciated  in 19 14 than  today,  and a generous 
use  of hyperbole  in pressing  Richmond’s  claims,  he 
was generally  given high grades  by his contemporaries 
as  an  advocate  of  the  city’s  cause. 
Supplementing  Seay’s  presentation  were  shorter 
statements  by William  T.  Reed,  T.  M.  Carrington, 
S.  C.  Mitchell,  and  Sands.  The  statements  of the 
first  three  were  concerned  with  Richmond’s  impor- 
tance  as a commercial  and  manufacturing  center,  its 
commercial  and  industrial  development  in  recent 
years,  and its potential  for growth  in the future.  Sands’ 
statement  was  directed  at  demonstrating  why  a 
branch,  rather  than  a regional  head  office,  could  not 
adequately  serve  the  area  that  looked  to  Richmond 
for  commercial  and  financial  leadership.  Following 
these  statements,  John  R.  Saunders,  a  member  of 
the  Virginia  Senate,  offered  the  rhetorical  support  of 
the  Virginia  General  Assembly. 
There  was  some  anomaly  in  the  position  of  the 
Carolinians  who  had  come  to  support  Richmond’s 
claims.  At the  time  of the  hearings  Charlotte,  N.C., 
and  Columbia,  S.C.,  were  vigorously  pressing  their 
own  campaigns.  A strong  show  of support  for Rich- 
mond  would  accordingly  undercut  these  campaigns. 
This  might  prove  especially  embarrassing  for 
Charlotte,  whose  delegation  was  scheduled  to  be 
heard  on  the  l&h,  following  Richmond’s  presen- 
tation.  Nevertheless  both  Carolinas’  delegations  came 
out  with  strong  and  unambiguous  support  for  Rich- 
mond.  Both  also  argued  vigorously  against  being 
placed  in  an  “east-west”  as  opposed  to  a  “north- 
south”  district.  They  opposed,  with  equal  vigor, 
being  connected  with  any city to their  south  or west. 
The  Revised Brief 
The  Richmonders  left the  hearings  confident  that 
they  had  made  a convincing  case,  yet  acknowledg- 
ing  that  there  was  still  work  to  be  done.  McAdoo 
and  Houston  had raised  a number  of questions  at the 
hearings,  suggesting  a need  for a more  complete  brief 
than  the  hastily prepared  fust  one.  Accordingly,  Seay 
undertook  to  provide  a more  systematic  and  com- 
plete  essay,  documenting  his  case  more  thoroughly 
with  banking  and  economic  data  on  the  proposed 
district.  This  brief  was  submitted  to  the  Organiza- 
tion  Committee  on  February  17. While  some  senti- 
ment  had  developed  for  making  adjustments  in the 
proposed  district,‘Seay  held  fast  to the  initial  boun- 
daries.  The  covering  letter,  however,  suggested  that 
the  proposed  district  could  be  extended  to  include 
the  District  of  Columbia,  Maryland,  and  northern 
West  Virginia  without  prejudice  to the  argument  for 
a Richmond  location.  The  added  area,  it was  noted, 
could  be  served  by  a branch  at  Baltimore. 
The  revised  document,  while more  carefully drawn 
than  the  first,  repeated  essentially  the  same 
arguments  as the  initial ones  elaborated  at the January 
1.5 hearings.  It  did,  however,  include  additional 
evidence  buttressing  the  contention  that  Richmond 
was  overwhelmingly  the  popular  choice  in the  pro- 
posed  district.  It reported  a poll of some  1,350  banks 
in the  region  which  showed  Richmond  to be  the  first 
choice  of 952,  second  choice  of 305,  and,third  choice 
of  78.  Thus  an  overwhelming  majority  expressed 
moderate-to-strong  preference  for  Richmond.  Of 
twelve  other  cities  for  which  preference  was  ex- 
pressed,  none  received  more  than  112 first preference 
votes  nor  more  than  163  moderate-to-strong 
preference  votes. 
Even  more  than  the  first  brief,  the  second  laid 
heavy  emphasis  on the  solidarity  of Virginia  and  the 
Carolinas,  insisting  that  the  three  states  constituted 
a nucleus  for a south-to-north  district  that  could  best 
be  served  by  a  regional  bank  at  Richmond.  Seay 
wrote: 
. . . there  is a very strong  feeling  in Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
and  South  Carolina  that  they  must  be  included  together  in 
any zone  which  may be formed,  and  that  whatever  territory 
may  be  incorporated  in their  zone,  a Federal  Reserve  Bank 
located  in Richmond  would  serve  their  interests  better  than 
if located  in  any  other  city. 
The  interests  of these  three  states  are  too  closely  inter- 
woven  to  be  separated. 
As  in  the  first  brief,  Richmond’s  advantages  were 
touted  in  grandiloquent,  often  florid,  prose.  Seay 
closed  it with  a turgid  and  unashamedly  hyperbolic 
emotional  appeal: 
Richmond  has a place  in the  affections  of the  South  which 
no  other  city  possesses. 
She  has  a place  in the  annals  of the  nation  and  the  world 
\which  is  imperishable. 
The  debt  of the  nation  to  Virginia  is  inextinguishable. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  this  Republic  could  have  been 
formed  without  Virginia. 
Richmond  has  that  dignity  of standing,  that  atmosphere 
of  sentiment  and  history,  that  position  in  science  and 
learning,  which  render  her worthy  of any honor  or distinction 
that  can be bestowed  upon  her,  and  the  intelligent  judgment 
of the  whole  country,  having  a knowledge  of these  consider- 
ations,  would  approve  the  location  of a Federal  Reserve  Bank 
in  Richmond. 
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All of these  considerations  preeminently  distinguish  Rich- 
mond  as  the  location  of  a  Federal  Reserve  Bank. 
Thus  did Seay  dun  the  Organization  Committee  for 
the  historic  services  of Virginia  and  Richmond. 
But the  Richmond  leaders  were  not content  to rest 
their  case  strictly  on  Seay’s  brief.  Two  additional 
briefs were  prepared.  The  first of these  was prepared 
by  a  consultant,  0.  P.  Austin,  who  sought  to 
demonstrate,  first,  that  the  proposed  district  con- 
stituted  a distinct  and differentiable  economic  region, 
with  a diverse  agricultural  and  industrial  base  suffi- 
ciently  large to require  its own regional  reserve  bank. 
Second,  he  undertook  to  show  that  Richmond  was 
the  ideal  site  for  the  reserve  bank  for  this  district. 
He  argued  that  the  “great  mass  of  distinctively 
southern  products  can  be  more  intelligently 
understood  and financed from a distinctively  southern 
city.  .  .  .” The  interests  of the  region’s  producers, 
he  added,  could  be  “better  served  from  Richmond 
than  Washington,  which  has  no  active  business 
relation  with the  producing,  manufacturing,  or com- 
mercial  interests,  or  from  Baltimore,  which  is still 
farther  removed  from  the  area  of the  chief  produc- 
tion  of  these  peculiar  and  distinctively  ‘local 
products.” 
The  second  supplement  to  Seay’s  brief  was  a 
memorandum  prepared  by  William  T.  Reed  of the 
Richmond  Chamber  of Commerce  and titled  “State- 
ment  Showing  Freight  Rates  from  Richmond  to 
southern  West  Virginia,  eastern  Kentucky,  eastern 
Tennessee,  North  and South  Carolina  and Georgia; 
also tonnage  from Virginia cities into North  and South 
Carolina  and  Georgia.”  According  to  this  memo- 
randum  the  railroads  serving  the  proposed  district 
“years  ago  recognized  Richmond  as  the  proper 
distributing  point,  and  [the proposed  district]  as the 
natural  territory  to Richmond,  owing  to the  fact that 
they  were  enabled  to  give  quick  service,  and  from 
one  to four  days  quicker  delivery  than  Baltimore,  or 
any city north  of us.” Rates  into the proposed  district 
from  Richmond,  it noted,  were  accordingly  fixed  at 
13 percent  below  those  from  Baltimore.  The  memo- 
randum  also gave  statistics  on tonnage  shipped  from 
Richmond  and  other  major  Virginia  cities  to  the 
Carolinas,  Georgia,  and Florida,  noting  that  data  for 
shipments  to eastern  Tennessee,  eastern  Kentucky, 
and southern  West Virginia were  not readily available. 
It openly  questioned  the  claim  made  by  Baltimore’s 
representatives  at  the  Washington  hearings  that 
Baltimore’s  tonnage  to  the  Carolinas,  Georgia  and 
Florida  exceeded  Richmond’s  and  challenged 
Baltimore  to  produce  the  statistics. 
Seay’s extended  brief  supplemented  by these  two 
addenda,  constituted  the  Richmond  case  as finally 
presented  to  the  Organization  Committee.  These 
three  elements,  along  with  supporting  statistical 
charts  and maps,  were  bound  together  in hardcover, 
under  title  of A Natural and Economic Tmitory jbr a 
Federal Reserve District  with  Richmond  RF th  Location 
of the Bank, and  distributed  generously  throughout 
the  proposed  district.  Thus  Seay’s  grandiloquent 
appeal  was  addressed  not  only  to  the  Organization 
Committee  but  also  to  much  of the  Old  South  by 
way of mobilizing  support  for the claims of the  capital 
of  the  fallen  Confederacy. 
The  Choice 
Richmond’s  two  daily  newspapers  followed 
closely the progress  of the  Organization  Committee’s 
grand  tour,  reporting  every  rumor  and  speculation 
regarding  Richmond’s  chances  of securing  a regional 
bank.  Press comment  reflected  increasing  confidence 
on  the  part  of the  campaign’s  leaders  who  appeared 
convinced  that  they  had  made  a strong  case.  There 
was general  satisfaction with the quality  of the revised 
brief.  With  the  help  of the  press,  leaders  were  able 
to maintain  a high pitch  of enthusiastic  support  from 
virtually  every  organized  group  in the  state,  while its 
congressional  delegation  pressed  the  Richmond  case 
in Washington.  Despite  rival campaigns  by Charlotte 
and  Columbia,  support  for  Richmond  in  both 
Carolinas  was strong  and growing.  These  rival cam- 
paigns lost momentum  after mid-February,  with both 
cities  coming  out  in favor  of Richmond  as a strong 
second  choice.  Great  hope  was placed  in presenting 
a united  front  with  the  two  Carolinas,  insisting  that 
the  three  states  be  placed  in the  same  district  with 
the  reserve  center  located  to  accommodate  north- 
south  flows  of commerce  and  finance.  This,  it was 
thought,  would  establish  an  important  Richmond 
advantage  over  Atlanta. 
As for  the  northern  end  of the  proposed  district, 
an important  consideration  was the  question  of the 
size of the  reserve  bank  that  would  almost  surely  be 
established.in  New  York.  Given  the  heavy  concen- 
tration  of banking  capital  and resources  in a relatively 
small geographic  area  of the  Northeast,  the  problem 
of keeping  the  several  reserve  banks  of reasonably 
uniform  capitalization,  as required  by  law,  could  be 
addressed  only  if the  reserve  districts  there  could  be 
kept  geographically  small.  As this problem  received 
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that  the  area  north  of the  Potomac  and  east  of the 
Great  Lakes  would  have  to  be  divided  into  three 
reserve  districts,  a  probability  which  was  well  ap- 
preciated  by  the  Richmond  leadership.  New  York 
and  Boston  seemed  certain  choices.  The  contest  for 
the  third was between  Philadelphia  and Baltimore  and 
the  outcome  was  of  crucial  interest  to  Richmond. 
The  choice  of Baltimore  would  almost  certainly  doom 
Richmond’s  chances,  while the  choice  of Philadelphia 
would  undercut  the  cases  of  Baltimore  and 
Washington.  Of  this,  the  Richmond  leaders  were 
quite  aware. 
As the  work  of the  Organization  Committee  pro- 
gressed  and was  commented  on and  analyzed  in the 
press,  Richmond’s  leaders  appeared  to have  increas- 
ing  reasons  for  optimism.  In  their  view,  the  city’s 
superior  transportation  and  communications  links 
between  the  South  Atlantic  and  the  great  centers  of 
the  Northeast  had  been  demonstrated.  Hence  Rich- 
mond  could  be  shown  to be  a natural  clearing  point 
for checks  originating  in the  South  Atlantic  states  as 
well  as a natural  reserve  center.  On  top  of this  they 
could  add  the  city’s historic  claim  to cultural  leader- 
ship  of the  Old  South,  which  was  no  small  matter, 
and a claim on the  chief architects  of the new  Reserve 
Act.  Now  that,  in their  own  perception,  the  claims 
of their  chief  rivals  were  crumbling,  there  was  every 
reason  to expect  a favorable  outcome  to their  intense 
efforts. 
Rumors  that  Richmond  would  in fact  be  chosen 
for one  of the  reserve  banks  began  to  appear  in the 
press  in March.  On  March  25,  the  Washington  cor- 
respondent  of  the  Nms  L,eader noted  “persistent 
reports  .  . . in circulation  in Washington  that  Rich- 
mond  will be  selected  by the  Organization  Commit- 
tee  as  one  of the  twelve  regional  bank  cities.  .  .  .” 
He  added: 
Three  weeks  ago  your  correspondent  told  of  the  inti- 
mation  in  semi-official  circles  that  the  Virginia  capital  city 
was  in the  lead  for the  reserve  city  of South  Atlantic  states 
banking  region. 
He  then  quoted  a  story  in  the  Nm  York &n  of 
March  25  naming,  “Upon  reliable  authority,”  the 
following  “tentative  list”  of reserve  cities:  “Boston, 
New  York,  Washington  or Richmond,  Chicago,  St. 
Louis,  San  Francisco,  Kansas  City,  Cincinnati, 
Atlanta  or  New  Orleans,  Dallas  or  Houston,  and 
Minneapolis.” 
On  the  following  day  the  same  journal  carried  a 
front-page  story  entitled  “Richmond  to Get  Regional 
Bank.”  The  story,  attributed  to  unofficial  but  “high 
and  trustworthy  sources,”  noted  that  Richmond  had 
won  her  fight  for  a regional  bank.  But  it added  that 
the  Organization  Committee  had  not  yet  voted  on 
the  issue.  Rather  it reported  that  the  Committee  had 
ruled  out  Baltimore  and  Washington  on grounds  that 
a bank  at Philadelphia  was  necessary  to contain  the 
size  of  the  bank  at  New  York. 
The  Organization  Committee’s  announcement 
came  on  April  2.  By prearrangement,  John  Skelton 
Williams,  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  had 
agreed  to  telephone  the  Richmond  campaign  to 
convey  the  decision  immediately  following  the 
Committee’s  final  meeting,  scheduled  for  the  late 
afternoon  of  that  day.  The  Richmond,  leaders  ex- 
pected  a  call  at  around  6  p.m.  To  receive  it  they 
gathered,  in  high  hopes,  in  the  banking  offices  of 
John  L.  Williams,  father  of the  Comptroller  of the 
Currency.  The  city’s  campaign  leaders,  along  with 
Governor  Stuart  and other  political leaders,  some  one 
hundred  according  to  press  reports,  were  present. 
The  expected  call came  and  the  Comptroller  of the 
Currency  talked  directly  to E. L.  Bemiss,  his brother- 
in-law  and  a prominent  local  banker.  Bemiss  under- 
took  to  repeat  for  the  benefit  of  the  group  each 
sentence  of  the  communication. 
The  Comptroller  provided  a touch  of drama  to the 
occasion  as  he  toyed  with  the  expectations  of  the 
crowd.  He  began  by announcing  District  1, with  the 
reserve  bank  at Boston,  and outlining  the  boundaries 
of the  district.  He  did  the  same  for District  2,  New 
York:  then  District  3,  Philadelphia;  and  District  4, 
Cleveland.  Meantime,  Seay,  George  C.  Gregory,  and 
Sands,  sat before  large maps  of the United  States  trac- 
ing out  the  boundaries  described  by Williams.  Then 
without  explanation,  Williams  skipped  District  5 and 
shifted  to  District  12,  San  Francisco,  then  moved 
on  to  11,  Dallas:  10,  Kansas  City;  9,  Minneapolis; 
8,  St.  Louis;  and  7,  Chicago.  He  then  announced, 
in  what  the  local  press  called  “a  spirit  of  grim 
humor”  that  that  was  all.  The  crowd  knew  better, 
however,  since  it could  be  seen  from  the  maps  that 
the  great  southeastern  section  of the  country  was left 
without  a reserve  bank.  Pressed,  Williams  mockingly 
admitted  that  there  was  another  district,  centered  on 
Atlanta.  When  he  laid  out  the  boundaries  of  that 
district,  it was  clear  that  there  remained  yet  another 
made  up of Maryland,  the  District  of Columbia,  West 
Virginia  excluding  four panhandle  counties,  Virginia 
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to  mull  the  question  of whether  the  center  of that 
final district  would  be  at Baltimore,  Washington,  or 
Richmond,  Williams  ended  the  suspense.  On  the 
announcement  that  Richmond  was  the  choice,  the 
local  leaders  joined  hands  and  gave  a  loud  cheer. 
The  Reaction 
The  announcement  touched  off a fever  of excite- 
ment  locally,  putting  the  city  in  a  mood  for  high 
celebration.  Local  newspapers  in the  days  following 
were  filled with  self-congratulatory  accounts  of how 
the  city  earned  the  distinction,  heaping  praise  upon 
the  campaign  leaders.  On  April  3,  the  morning  after 
the  announcement,  the  Times-Dispatch  published  a 
special  16-page  Federal  Reserve  Section,  chroni- 
cling  the  details  of the  long  campaign  and  including 
pages  of  advertisements  by  local  banks  and 
businesses  congratulating  the  city  on  the  successful 
issue  of the  campaign. 
Much  credit  for the  campaign’s  success  was  attri- 
buted  to  the  brief  presented  to  the  Organization 
Committee.  “The  brief  was  convincing,”  one  story 
noted.  “Richmond’s  claim  was  based  upon  Rich- 
mond’s  financial  strength  and  its ability  to  serve  the 
section  included  in its region.”  Seay’s role in the  cam- 
paign  was emphasized  and  his brief was  reprinted  in 
full.  The  Richmond  team,  the  editor  added,  “pre- 
sented  a  case  unexcelled  by  any  laid  before  the 
Organization  Committee.” 
The  Richmond  press  was  especially  profuse  in its 
expression  of gratitude  to support  from  neighboring 
states.  Recognizing  the  crucial  help  of  these  sup- 
porters,  the  editor  of  the  Times-Dispatch  wrote  on 
April  3,  “.  . . Richmond  would  not  this  morning  be 
a Federal  reserve  city had  not  our friends  in Virginia, 
in  North  Carolina,  in  South  Carolina,  in  East 
Tennessee  and  in West  Virginia  made  it  so.”  Like 
expressions  appeared  in an editorial  of the  same  day 
in the  News LRader. Both  newspapers  featured  pages 
of pictures  of leading  supporters  from  other  state  as 
well  as  local  leaders. 
The  significance  of the  reserve  bank  for the  future 
of  Richmond  was  discussed  at  length-and  not 
without  exaggeration-in  both  papers.  Each  carried 
special  articles  by  some  of  the  leading  individuals 
involved  in the  Richmond  campaign.  For  the  Times- 
Dispatch  of April  3,  for example,  in an  article  under 
the  headline  “What  Reserve  Bank  Means  to  Rich- 
mond,”  Sands  wrote: 
The  establishment  and  operation  of an  institution  of such 
momentous  power  and  wide  influence  as  the  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond  will  give  to  the  city  of 
Richmond  great  prominence  and  will centre  [sic] here  the 
whole  financial  operations  of  this  large  and  wonderfully 
prosperous  territory. 
He  added  that  on the  night  of the  announcement  “far 
sighted  businessmen”  predicted  “great  growth”  in 
Richmond,  commercially,  industrially,  and financially. 
A leading  local  banker  was  quoted  as  expressing  a 
belief that  Richmond  would  become  one  of the  great 
cities of the  country,  noting  that  there  was “practically 
no limit to what  may be the  ultimate  outcome  to this 
city  of  the  action  that  has  been  taken  today.” 
Every  story-even  every  advertisement-in  the 
April 3rd editions  exuded  euphoric  evaluations  of the 
city’s future.  Richmond  was  referred  to  as a “finan- 
cial Gibraltar,”  the  center  of a “new financial empire,n 
the  “seventh  greatest  financial  center  of  the  coun- 
try.”  Expectations  ran  high. 
In the  exhilaration  of victory,  the  city’s  Chamber 
of Commerce  hastily  planned  a celebration  to honor 
the  campaign’s  leaders  and  workers.  A  banquet 
at  the  Jefferson  Hotel  honored  the  campaign’s 
executive  committee.  Special  honors  were  reserved 
for  George  C.  Gregory,  executive  secretary  of the 
committee,  and invited  guest  George  A. Holderness, 
president  of the  North  Carolina  Bankers  Association 
and a strong  supporter  of Richmond’s  candidacy  from 
the  beginning.  Some  800  attended  the  mass  meeting 
and buffet  supper.  McAdoo,  Houston,  and Williams 
were  invited  to share  in the  occasion  but  all pleaded 
the  pressure  of additional  work  toward  organizing  the 
new  system. 
The  entire  state  rejoiced  with  Richmond  at  the 
news  of the  successful  issue  of the  city’s campaign. 
Editorials  and  news  stories  in the  press  of the  state’s 
other  leading  cities  reflected  the  same  exhilaration- 
and  the  same  exaggerated  expectations  of  future 
benefits-noted  in the  Richmond  newspapers.  The 
banking  communities  of  the  Carolinas  also  ex- 
pressed  general  satisfaction.  The  Charlotte,  N.C., 
Daily O/U~#  of April  4 noted  that  the  choice  met 
with  general  approval  in  Charlotte  and  throughout 
the  state.  Similar expressions  appeared  in the  leading 
newspapers  of both  Carolinas,  with  some  manifesting 
an  enthusiasm  approaching  that  of  the  Richmond 
press. 
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The  selection  of Richmond  as the  site of a reserve 
bank  was  not  universally  endorsed.  The  banking 
communities  of Washington  and  Baltimore  reacted 
with  disbelief,  their  spokesmen  suggesting  that 
politics  and favoritism  had  been  determining  factors 
in the  Organization  Committee’s  decision.  These  two 
great  cities,  Th  Wkdington Post  reported,  “must  now 
do  all  reserve  business  through  [al  comparatively 
small  institution  in  the  former  capital  of  the  Con- 
federacy.”  In both  cities,  civic pride  and  self-esteem 
had  suffered  a  blow. 
The  reaction  in Washington  and Baltimore  was part 
of a much  broader  criticism  of the  Organization  Com- 
mittee.  Of the  37  cities  seeking  a reserve  bank,  25 
were  perforce  disappointed.  McAdoo,  Houston,  and 
Williams  all  came  under  personal  attack  for  alleg- 
edly  using  influence  to locate  reserve  banks  in their 
home  states.  The  choice  of  cities  was  subject  to 
acrimonious  debate  in both  chambers  of Congress. 
In the  Senate  a resolution  was  passed  calling  on  the 
Committee  to submit  the  briefs  of all cities  applying 
for  a  reserve  bank  along  with  the  reasons  for  its 
choices. 
The  Committee  responded  in  a  report  dated 
April  10,  1914.  The  report  noted  that  in the  poll  of 
banks  made  for  the  Committee  by  the  office  of the 
Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  Richmond  received 
more  votes  than  any  other  city  in the  district-  168 
as  against  128  for  Baltimore  and  only  2.5  for 
Washington.  It pointed  out,  moreover,  that  leaving 
out  the  states  of Maryland  and  Virginia,  Richmond 
received  from  the  rest  of the  district  triple  the  votes 
for  Baltimore.  It  cited  the  latest  reports  to  the 
Comptroller  as  indicating  that  the  business  of  the 
national  banks  of  Virginia,  including  Richmond, 
exceeded  that  of  their  counterparts  in  Maryland, 
including  Baltimore,  or in any other  state  in the  Fifth 
District.  The  same  reports,  it added,  showed  Rich- 
mond’s  national  banks  were  lending  in  the  13 
Southern  states  more  than  the  national  banks  of any 
city  except  New  York.  Outside  of  Virginia  and 
Maryland,  the  loans  of  Richmond’s  national  banks 
to the remaining  parts  of the  Fifth  District  were  twice 
as great  as those  of the  national  banks  of Baltimore 
and  Washington  combined. 
Despite  the  Committee’s  prompt  defense  of  its 
decision,  the  choice  of  Richmond  over  Baltimore 
and  of  Atlanta  over  New  Orleans  continued  to 
arouse  opposition.  The  choice  of Richmond  found 
little  favor  in New  York,  where  many  bankers  were 
critical  of the  delineation  of reserve  districts  along 
the  Atlantic  seaboard.  Especially  in Washington  and 
Baltimore,  the  hand  of John  Skelton  Williams  was 
seen  as  the  determining  factor  in  the  Richmond 
location. 
Baltimore’s  leaders  proceeded  to  mount  a 
multifaceted  campaign  to  reverse  the  Organization 
Committee’s  choice  of  Richmond  and  to  have  the 
reserve  bank  moved  to  Baltimore.  They  quickly 
formed  a committee  made  up  of the  local  board  of 
trade,  the  clearinghouse  association,  the  chamber  of 
commerce,  and  a  large  miscellany  of  local  trade 
associations.  The  city’s  leaders  expressed  a  deter- 
mination  to carry  their  appeal  beyond  the  Organiza- 
tion  Committee,  if necessary,  to the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  when  it was  organized  and  even  to Congress. 
The  local  press  was  an  enthusiastic  participant  in 
these  efforts,  carrying  stories  and  editorials  detail- 
ing the “injustice”  to the  city.  The  press  played  a key 
role,  especially  in  efforts  to  arouse  enthusiastic 
popular  support  for  the  campaign.  To  that  end  the 
city’s  leaders  organized  a massive  demonstration  in 
downtown  Baltimore  on  the  evening  of  April  15. 
On  April  29  Baltimore’s  committee  addressed  a 
letter  to the  Organization  Committee  requesting  that 
the  choice  of Richmond  be  reviewed  and noting  that 
in the  absence  of action  by  the  latter  committee,  an 
appeal  would  be made  to the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
when  that  body  was  constituted.  The  Baltimore 
group  also  requested  that  the  Committee  delay  the 
organization  of the  Richmond  reserve  bank  pending 
Federal  Reserve  Board  action  on  the  appeal.  The 
Committee  refused  to  grant  either  request. 
Nothing  daunted,  the  Baltimore  committee’s  pro- 
fessional  staff proceeded  to  put  together  a carefully 
structured  brief  to support  the  appeal  to the  Federal 
Reserve  Board.  The  Baltimore  appeal,  along with  this 
brief,  was  filed  with  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  on 
September  11,  1914. 
The  Richmond  leadership,  backed  strongly  by the 
local press,  responded  sharply  to the  Baltimore  cam- 
paign.  Something  of an  editorial  war  developed  be- 
tween  the  newspapers  of  the  two  cities. 
In  spite  of the  efforts  of the  Baltimore  media  and 
city  leaders  to  redirect  the  location  of  the  reserve 
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the  selection  of  Richmond.  By  mid-October,  the 
Richmond  reserve  bank  had  been  incorporated  and 
its  board  of  directors  had  been  chosen.  These  in- 
cluded  two  top  leaders  of the  Baltimore  campaign, 
William  Ingle,  who  was named  chairman  and Federal 
Reserve  Agent,  and  Waldo  Newcomer,  chosen  a 
Class  A  director. 
Such  a  prime  position  in  the  management  of 
the  new  institution  tended  to  assuage  Baltimore’s 
loss  and  the  city’s  banking  community  apparently 
accommodated  itself  to  the  Richmond  choice, 
hoping  to  become  a  branch  site.  The  appeal, 
however,  remained  before  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board,  which  never  acted  on  it.  The  issue  was 
settled  by  a  ruling  by  the  Attorney  General  of 
the  United  States  holding  that  the  Board  did  not 
possess  the  authority  to  change  the  location  of  a 
reserve  bank  within  a  district.  Thus  ended  the 
Baltimore  challenge. 
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